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Abstract: Time-of-use (TOU) electricity tariffs are a demand side measure to ease balancing of
demand and supply to cope with a rising share of renewables in a country’s electricity mix. In
general, consumers require compensation for accepting these tariffs. This study analyzes how
attitudes drive consumers’ willingness to choose a TOU tariff in Germany. To identify attitudinal
profiles, I use an exploratory factor analysis on items capturing positive and negative attitudes towards
TOU tariffs, climate change awareness, and belief in energy saving measures. I use these factors as predictors
in an ordered logit specification to estimate consumers’ stated willingness to choose a TOU tariff.
Three factors are significant: positive and negative attitudes towards TOU tariffs, and climate change
awareness. These findings highlight that decision makers who aim at balancing demand and supply
through the use of TOU tariffs should focus on informing consumers about the positive impacts of
these tariffs on climate change mitigation, grid stability, and possible energy savings.
Keywords: time-of-use electricity tariff; factor analysis; preferences; willingness to adapt
1. Introduction
Two major issues in electricity markets are the volatility in renewable energy gen-
eration and peak demand. Both force network operators to costly redispatch in order to
avoid outages when electricity demand and supply are unbalanced [1]. This holds true
as long as storage technologies are not mature. Electricity tariffs with prices that reflect
excess demand or supply, such as time-of-use tariffs (TOU), dynamic pricing (including
real-time pricing) or critical peak time pricing, are prominent demand side measures to
balance demand and supply. Given the current energy policy goals of a rising share of
renewables in the electricity mix, acceptance of such measures is crucial.
In the USA, India, and 17 European countries (including Germany) time differen-
tiated electricity tariffs were available in 2019 [2]. Several member states of the Euro-
pean Union (and Norway and UK) already offer real-time tariffs or other dynamic tariffs
(Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and
UK), or critical peak pricing (Denmark, France, Latvia, and Slovenia); while 13 countries
offered static TOU tariffs [3]. These member states already implemented the EU Direc-
tive 2019/944 [4] which states that consumers should financially benefit from demand
response, e.g., real-time pricing. Germany has enacted this Directive into law in July 2021
by adding paragraph 41a to the Energiewirtschaftsgesetz [5]. However, until 2025 only
large utility companies (more than 100,000 customers) have to offer at least one dynamic
tariff to German end consumers, i.e., these tariffs need not necessarily be offered to private
consumers [5].
Although electricity markets globally move fast forward towards real-time pricing,
TOU tariffs are neither common nor widely adopted by German consumers. According
to the Federal Network Agency’s most recent energy monitoring report [6], only two
providers offered electricity tariffs reflecting day-ahead prices in 2019. One reason is
that only around 1000 smart meters had been rolled-out in private households by 2019.
Furthermore, usually only conservative day/night-time TOU tariffs are available, targeted
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at households with electric heating. Besides this, Germany is particularly interesting as
policies are in place to expand the share of renewables in the gross electricity consumption
from 45.4% in 2020 [7] to 65% in 2030 [8]. Thus, potential savings in CO2-emissions by
increasing acceptance of TOU tariffs, or even real-time pricing, are promising [9], since more
frequent redispatch could be avoided. A choice experiment [9] conducted nearly one year
after the survey in which this paper is based on, revealed that about 70% of respondents
would at least consider to choose TOU tariffs that are tied to electricity demand and supply,
in Germany. Even though significant preference heterogeneity was found in this study, it
was not possible to explain what drives observed heterogeneity.
Hence, this work analysis to what extent attitudes drive heterogeneity in preferences
for TOU tariffs. The novelty is that, instead of including just a single behavioral aspect,
25 statements measuring attitudes towards TOU tariffs, climate change, and energy saving
measures reduced to four factors are used to estimate respondents’ preferences for TOU
tariffs. Hereby, preference is measured by respondents’ agreement with the statement
about whether they would rather purchase a TOU tariff than their current tariff. Since the
underlying survey was conducted in Germany, where these tariffs are still uncommon,
this study is restricted to TOU tariffs with electricity prices tied to electricity demand and
supply to decrease respondents’ cognitive burden.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview on previous
studies discussing the role of selected attitudes in preferences for TOU tariffs and presents
their relevance in a broader energy context. Section 3 describes the underlying behavioral
theories and how they were acknowledged in the survey. Furthermore, it presents the
econometric approach and the data set. Section 4 comprises the results of a factor analysis
on respondents’ attitudes, an estimation of respondents’ willingness to choose a TOU
tariff using the identified factors as explanatory variables, and insight into the predictive
power of the final model. Section 5 discusses these results while Section 6 concludes and
highlights implications for decision makers and further research.
2. Literature Review
Common methods used to measure acceptance for TOU tariffs are choice experiments
such as the stated preference method (e.g., [9]) and field experiments such as the revealed
preference method (e.g., [10]). Choice experiments usually provide an explicit hypotheti-
cal willingness to accept depending on tariffs’ attributes, while field experiments aim at
observing households’ actual behavior. Main finding of both branches is that preference
heterogeneity exists but cannot fully be explained by common socio-demographic char-
acteristics (e.g., [11]). In recent research mostly one distinct behavioral aspect (e.g., risk
aversion, e.g., [12]) has been added to explain heterogeneity in preferences.
These studies agree that we observe heterogeneous preferences towards consumers’
acceptance of TOU tariffs (see [9] for a recent overview). As stated above, some studies
identified single behavioral drivers of this heterogeneity. For example, Schlereth et al. [12]
found in their choice experiment that consumers who are more risk-averse tend to prefer
time-invariant pricing. Nicolson et al. [13] found the same for loss-averse consumers in a
field experiment. In their choice experiment, Buryk et al. [14] discovered that consumers
who had been informed about environmental and system benefits of TOU and dynamic
tariffs had an almost 10% lower willingness to accept (WTA) than non-informed respon-
dents. Furthermore, males exhibit a larger WTA while those who consider it rather easy to
adapt their behavior exhibit a lower WTA. Discussing with focus groups, Hall et al. [15]
found evidence that consumers’ awareness of environmental benefits and their ability to
shift their demand influence their willingness to choose a tariff with cost-reflective pricing.
In contrast to Buryk et al. [14], however, they find that men are more in favor for TOU
tariffs than women. In addition, Yang et al. [10] validated that knowledge about peak and
off-peak pricing in respondents’ region increases acceptance of TOU tariffs using personal
interviews. Summarized, these studies have identified attitudinal drivers of preferences
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but only focus on selected aspects and do not explicitly rely on complex behavioral theories,
such as the theory of planned behavior (TPB, [16]) or value-belief norm (VBN, [17]).
In the broader literature on energy issues, i.e., electricity prices tied to electricity
consumption (e.g., [18]), load-restrictions (e.g., [19,20]), green electricity (e.g., [21–24])
or energy technologies (e.g., [25,26]), attitudes were found to explain heterogeneity in
preferences. Wang et al. [18], for example, hypothesized that consumers’ willingness to
choose an electricity tariff with prices tied to electricity consumption is driven by elements
of TPB, verified it by factor analysis, and estimated willingness to choose this tariff using
an ordered logit. They found a significant impact of environmental/global warming
awareness, energy saving behavior, social pressure, and electricity literacy on acceptance.
In their choice experiment, Gołębiowska et al. [19] analyzed the impact of norms on
preferences for external control of electricity consumption. They measured personal, social,
and descriptive social norms using four items, and found that descriptive norms had the
largest impact on preferences while personal and social had only a weak effect. Most
recently, Broberg et al. [20] showed in their split sample choice experiment that people
were less likely to choose their current tariff over a tariff with load-restrictions if they were
previously framed in such a way that these tariffs ease renewable energy transition.
Studies focusing on preferences for green electricity mainly rely on the TPB (e.g., [22–24]),
or its predecessor reasoned action theory (e.g., [21]). Ozaki [24] additionally took Roger’s
idea of innovation-diffusion adaption, and the VBN into account. Their results show that pro-
environmental attitudes and environmental concerns increase willingness to pay (WTP) for
green electricity [21,23] and willingness to adapt [24]. The same holds for knowledge [21–24],
belief in positive consequences [21,22], social norms [23,24], and personal benefits [24]. For
energy technologies results are similar. Makki and Mosly [25] performed a factor analysis
on statements they collected by an extended literature research. They identified five factors
describing preferences for green technologies including public awareness. Additionally,
van Rijnsoever and Farla [26] found that, again, knowledge and environmental awareness—
measured using the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP, [27]) scale—drives preferences.
Since former studies showed that TPB and VBN are feasible to explain preference
heterogeneity in energy-related fields, it is reasonable to adapt these concepts on preferences
for TOU tariffs as well. This study, therefore, fills this gap of a broader, behavioral theory-
based analysis of the role of consumers’ underlying attitudes as drivers of their willingness
to choose a TOU tariff.
3. Methodology and Data
3.1. Theoretical Background
To explore attitudes as drivers of preferences for TOU tariffs, two different but overlap-
ping theories that explain pro-environmental behavior (see [28]) are mainly tested in terms
of stated willingness to choose a TOU tariff: The TPB, [16] and the VBN [17]. The relevance
of common factors is, in a first step, identified through an exploratory factor analysis on
statements related to consumers’ expectations about the impact of TOU tariffs, their moti-
vation to adapt their behavior, and their climate change awareness. Subsequently, these
factors are used as explanatory variables in an ordered logit model to estimate consumers’
stated willingness to choose a TOU tariff.
These two theories were chosen since Steg and Vlek [28] identified three general
approaches to explain pro-environmental behavior. The first approach is that consumers
weight costs and benefits of their behavior. This is constituted by the TPB [16]. The second
approach assumes that consumer behavior is driven by moral and norms, based, e.g., on the
VBN that combines environmental awareness (usually measured using the NEP scale [27]),
beliefs and norms [17]. The third approach explains actual buying decisions by affect. As
my analysis relies on stated preferences for hypothetical TOU tariffs, this approach is not
further considered. Furthermore, as highlighted in the literature review, especially TPB
and VBN are promising to explain energy behavior. A combination of theories may also
increase exploratory power, which has been shown by Liebe et al. [29] to be related to forest
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conservation. Following their suggestions, this study combines and adjusts elements of
TPB and VBN to test their explanatory power for preferences for TOU tariffs.
According to the TPB [16] an individual’s attitude towards a behavior, subjective
norms, and perceived behavior control drive intention to behave. Related to this paper,
consumers would choose a TOU tariff if they exhibit a positive attitude towards TOU
tariffs, purchasing a TOU tariff would match their subjective norms, and they have the
possibility to choose a TOU tariff. To be more precise, respondents form their attitude
towards TOU tariffs by evaluating expected positive and negative impacts of TOU tariffs.
Subjective norms cover normative beliefs (how should personal surroundings behave and
how do they want one to behave?) and a feeling of moral obligation to decrease emissions
ensuring mitigation of climate change. Perceived behavioral control is the extent to which
respondents believe they are able to adapt a TOU tariff and how easy or difficult they
find it to adapt their behavior. This includes respondents’ ability to shift their electricity
demand when electricity prices are high.
The VBN [17] combines value theory, norm-activation, and environmental awareness
to explain pro-environmental behavior. According to this theory, values drive one’s eco-
logical worldview. Biospheric and altruistic values increase environmentalism, whereas
egoistic values decrease it. Depending on this ecological worldview, belief in consequences
of a threat is formed. Awareness of consequences results in awareness of need and respon-
sibility to reduce a threat, and in an evaluation of ability to reduce a threat. This awareness
results in action, depending on personal norms. Instead of environmental awareness, this
study uses climate change awareness, which is also driven by altruism [30]. Significant
climate change awareness should, hence, increase a respondent’s awareness of need of
actions to mitigate climate change. If a respondent is able to adapt her behavior and
believes that TOU tariffs mitigate climate change she should be willing to choose a TOU
tariff.
This study measures climate change awareness using a 7-item scale adopted from
the NEP scale [27]. The idea is that attitudes towards TOU tariffs are rather driven by
climate change awareness than environmental awareness, since these tariffs rather mitigate
CO2-emissions and, therefore, provide only an indirect environmental benefit. The NEP
scale itself was first developed by Dunlap and van Liere [27]. Initially, they used 12 items
covering statements about the environment to measure environmental awareness. In 1990,
this scale was revised to a 15-item scale [31] called the New Ecological Paradigm Scale. In
empirical applications often shorter scales are used (e.g., Pierce et al. 1987).
Additionally, this study considers that instead of pure altruism, rather, a “warm
glow” [32] on mitigating climate change might influence respondents’ willingness to choose
a TOU tariff. This would be in line with Hartmann et al. [33] who found that warm glow has
a stronger impact on pro-environmental behavior than just altruistic values. Nevertheless,
altruistic values, i.e., taking actions to increase other peoples’ welfare without gaining
benefits yourself, increases the propensity to experience a warm glow, i.e., emotionally
benefiting from altruistic actions [32]. In the context of green electricity Menges et al. [34]
showed that warm glow indeed increases willingness to pay for green electricity.
3.2. Econometric Approach
Stated attitudes are highly correlated. Therefore, estimated coefficients of a regression
model would be biased because of multicollinearity. Using factors containing most infor-
mation of these stated attitudes solves this issue. Hence, an exploratory factor analysis is
performed to identify relevant factors.
Lawley and Maxwell [35] showed that a linear combination of factors can explain the
n observed variables:
yij = zi1b1j + zi2b2j + . . . + ziqbqj + eij (1)
where yij is the observed value of the ith individual on the jth behavioral statement, zik
is the ith observation on the kth unobserved common factor, and bkj is the set of linear
coefficients called the factor loadings. eij is the jth variable’s unique factor. Here, yij is a
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four-dimensional ordinal variable, hence, the analysis is based on variables’ correlation
matrix, i.e., a polychoric correlation matrix [36].
Factors were retained using principal factors, and subsequently rotated ensuring better
interpretation. Since for each variable uniqueness is clearly non-zero, an oblique promax
rotation was performed. Promax is a simple rotation method that increases high factor
loadings while decreasing low factor loadings and allows for correlated factors [37] (Using
other oblique rotation methods did not significantly change results). Based on estimated
factor loadings, respondents’ individual factors are predicted.
To analyze if these retained factors explain stated willingness to choose a TOU tariff,
an ordered logit model is estimated. An ordered logit is a generalization of logit [38] that
allows for ordinal variables. It estimates the probability that an outcome for individual i
falls into category l by estimating the probability that a linear function of observed variables
is within a range of cutpoints:
Pr(outcomei = l) = Pr(κl−1 < β1x1i + β2x2i + . . . + βm1xmi + ui ≤ κl) (2)
where κl is the cutpoint of category l of the willingness to choose a TOU tariff, xni is the ith
observation on the nth explanatory variable, and βM is the set of coefficients. uj is ith indi-
vidual’s logistically distributed error term. The econometric analysis was performed using
Stata 15.1 including the user-written add-on "polychoric" by Kolenikov and Angeles [39].
3.3. Survey Design
The analysis is based on an online survey on consumers’ preferences for TOU tariffs
that was carried out in March and April 2016 in Germany (even though attitudes may
have changed over the last five years, results of the factor analysis will be persistent
and how these factors influence willingness to choose a TOU tariff is independent of
individual attitudes). The final sample comprises 990 panelists of an external panel provider
(Consumerfieldwork GmbH) who incentivize their members by paying them less than 3€
per completed survey. This panel provider drew a random sample of their panel members
and invited them via email to answer the survey. Quota sampling was conducted to ensure
sample’s representativeness for Germany in terms of age groups and gender. Northern
Germany (Northern Germany consists of the following federal states: Schleswig-Holstein,
Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bremen, and Mecklenburg-Western-Pomerania) is oversampled
(50% instead of 18%) since it is disproportionately affected by the expansion of renewable
energies. One shortcoming of this oversample is that the small sample size did not allow for
the addition of other quotas, such as those related to housing characteristics. Respondents
were at least 18 years old.
The survey (see Appendix B) included four parts: (1) screen-out questions; (2) elec-
tricity consumption related questions; (3) attitudinal questions; and (4) additional sociode-
mographic questions. The first part comprised questions about age, gender, and state of
residence to enable a representative sample. The second part involved general questions
about household’s electricity consumption, their electric appliances affecting electricity con-
sumption (e.g., electric heating, and private microgeneration), and their current electricity
tariff.
Before the attitudinal questions in part three, respondents were given information
on TOU tariffs (see Appendix B; question 11). These were described as a measure to
balance electricity demand and supply; i.e., a tariff with a high electricity price when
demand exceeds supply and vice versa. Additionally, it was mentioned that—at least in
Germany—redispatch is a costly and CO2-intensive measure to handle excess demand.
Furthermore, respondents were reminded that they could actually lower their electricity
bill if they shifted their electricity demand. Initially, respondents were randomly assigned
to two treatments that differed by the reasoning of TOU tariffs. TOU tariffs were described
as a measure to decrease electricity demand either during peak demand or when renewable
energy supply is low. Since these treatments have no effect on the results of this analysis
(insignificance of the treatment variable), they are treated as one sample.
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Part three focused on behavioral aspects and respondents’ stated willingness to choose
a TOU tariff as described in the previous paragraph (see Section 4.1 for summary statistics).
At first, respondents provided information on their current electricity tariffs and drivers
for their decision-making. Subsequently, respondents revealed their values, attitudes, and
subjective norms based on the TPB and the VBN with regard to TOU tariffs (i.e., their
climate change awareness; their evaluation of electricity saving measures; their perception
of TOU tariff’s impacts; and their motivation to choose a TOU tariff; see Appendix B,
questions 16–19). Each statement was measured using a four-item response scale. On
these 25 statements in questions 16 to 19, the exploratory factor analysis was performed;
subsequently an ordered logit was used to estimate respondents stated willingness to
choose a TOU tariff (first item of question 19) using the identified factors as explanatory
variable. The third part concluded with a self-assessment of respondents’ willingness
to take risk using a 10-item Likert scale ranging from “absolutely not willing to take
risk” to “absolutely willing to take risk” (see Appendix B, question 20). The final section
contained general sociodemographic questions, such as net household income, educational
attainment, and employment status.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Sample Statistics
Table 1 provides an overview of the sample. Note, that it is representative regarding
age and gender for the target population. As usual for online surveys, respondents with a
higher education level (12 to 13 years of schooling) are overrepresented. Median income,
employment status and household size are similar to the target population.
Turning to respondents’ current electricity tariffs (Table 2), about 20.5% have a tariff
that consists of 100% renewable electricity. Only about 9% already have a TOU tariff. In
Germany, these tariffs are currently designed to incur low prices at night and higher prices
otherwise. This indicates that there is a high potential for shifting electricity demand in
Germany. Note that, market shares of electricity tariffs are not available for Germany.
However, stakeholders agree that shares of TOU tariffs, smart home tariffs and special
tariffs for heat pump/night storage heating are very low. Furthermore, the market share in
electricity sales of 100% renewable energy tariffs amounted to 23.1% in 2016 [40]. Assuming
that average electricity consumption is independent of electricity tariff characteristics, the
share of 100% renewable tariffs in this sample seems reasonable.
Table 1. Sociodemographic characteristics.
Sample
Characteristic Levels Number Share Germany 1
Sample 990 100% 82.5 Million
Gender
Female 504 50.91% 50.68%
Male 486 49.09% 49.32%
Age (18 y and older) Mean 49.29 50.61
Median 50 51
Household size Mean 2.21 2.01
Household net income
(in categories)
Median category 2000 €–2499 € 2000 €–2599 €
Missing 123 12.42%
Education (in years of
schooling)
Low (Up to 9) 121 12.22% 35.05%
Middle (10) 357 36.06% 29.44%
High (12 to 13) 486 49.09% 30.77%
Missing/not applicable 26 2.63% 4.75%
Employment
Full-time 337 34.04% 32.06%
Part-time 131 13.23% 12.83%
Retired 281 28.38% 22.92%
Other 226 22.83% 31.71%
Missing 15 1.52% 0.12%
1 Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt [41], own calculations. Note that mean and median age is calculated for population 18yrs and older.
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Table 2. Characteristics of current electricity tariff.


















Note: Multiple answers possible. See Appendix B, question 9 for details.
Tables 3–6 provide information on respondents’ attitudes later used for the exploratory
factor analysis. Table 3 summarizes motivational aspects, i.e., subjective norms (TPB),
values (VBN) and perceived behavior control (TPB). Note that the first item stated willingness
to choose a TOU tariff is the dependent variable in the regression analysis. On average,
respondents would rather not choose a TOU tariff instead of their current tariff. This
could be related to the fact that they are unsure whether they can adjust their electricity
consumption. Surprisingly, respondents disagree that their social environment would
support their decision in favor of a TOU tariff. However, on average, respondents expect
others to behave in an environmentally friendly way and care about others (last statement).
Table 3. Statements measuring motivation and social norms.
Statement Mean (Std.dev.) Mode
I would like to choose a TOU tariff rather
than my current electricity tariff 1 2.29 (0.86) 2
I am doing enough already to save energy;
thus, I do not additionally need to choose an electricity tariff
with variable electricity prices
2.68 (0.82) 3
My social environment would like it if I would choose TOU tariff 2.36 (0.85) 2
I expect other people around me
to behave in an environmentally friendly way 3.13 (0.73) 3
For me, it would be easy to limit my electricity consumption in case I am at home
when electricity prices are high 2.52 (0.90) 3
Purchasing such an electricity tariff gives me a warm glow
to contribute to climate protection 2.58 (0.87) 3
I do not want others to suffer from the impacts of climate change 3.24 (0.68) 3
Note: Variables measured using a 4-item scale: 1 fully disagree—2 rather disagree—3 rather agree—4 fully agree. See Appendix B, question
19 for details. 1 This statement is referred to as (stated) willingness to purchase a TOU tariff .
To capture awareness of the need for and consequences of TOU tariffs (VBN), as
well as more general attitudes towards them (TPB), respondents were asked to rate their
expectations regarding the potential impact of TOU tariffs (Table 4). Respondents on
average do not clearly agree or disagree with these statements. This might relate to their
inexperience with TOU tariffs. Nevertheless, respondents clearly expect increasing monthly
electricity costs and increasing electricity providers’ profits by TOU tariffs.
In terms of perception of the feasibility of electricity-saving measures, Table 5 provides
first insights into respondents’ attitudes towards TOU tariffs (related to TPB). On average
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respondents are not sure if TOU tariffs will save any electricity at all. This is understandable
since the main objective of TOU tariffs is to shift electricity demand, and not to lower it.
However, respondents do not believe that an increase in average electricity prices would
reduce electricity demand. This may indicate that respondents are not willing to reduce
their electricity consumption in general.
Table 4. Perceived Impacts of TOU tariffs with prices related to electricity demand and supply.
Impact Mean (Std.dev.) Mode
Ensures that power outages will continue to be rare in Germany 2.79 (0.78) 3
Mitigates CO2 emissions 2.62 (0.82) 3
Increases monthly electricity costs 2.95 (0.79) 3
Increases electricity providers’ profits 3.08 (0.79) 3
Will lead to electricity shortages during certain times 2.54 (0.86) 3
Decreases electricity consumption 2.44 (0.81) 2
Note: Variables measured using a 4-item scale: 1 fully disagree—2 rather disagree—3 rather agree—4 fully agree. See Appendix B, question
18 for details.
Table 5. Feasibility of electricity saving measures.
Measure Mean (Std.dev.) Mode
Purchasing a TOU tariff 1 2.48 (0.87) 3
Switching off electrical appliances instead of using stand-by 3.53 (0.65) 4
Increasing average electricity prices 1.88 (0.76) 2
Switching off lights when leaving a room 3.51 (0.69) 4
Buying electrical appliances with low electricity consumption 3.57 (0.64) 4
Replacing old light bulbs or halogen bulbsby electricity saving alternatives 3.36 (0.77) 4
Note: Variables measured using a 4-item scale: 1 not feasible—2 somewhat not feasible—3 somewhat feasible—4 feasible. 1 Description
varies by treatment (see Appendix B, question 17 for details).
Table 6 summarizes respondents’ climate change awareness. Note that on average,
climate change is perceived as a real, serious and human-made problem. Respondents, on
average, rather disagree with the statements that climate change can be handled without
limiting our lifestyles and that media exaggerates climate change.
Table 6. Climate change awareness.
Statement Mean (Std.dev.) Mode
Climate change is a serious problem 3.47 (0.73) 4
My personal actions influence climate change 2.97 (0.81) 3
Humans are responsible for climate change 3.33 (0.74) 4
There will be a solution to climate change
without limiting our lifestyle 2.15 (0.84) 2
Scientific predictions regarding climate change are trustworthy 2.92 (0.72) 3
I am sure that climate change is happening 3.37 (0.69) 4
Media exaggerates climate change 2.20 (0.89) 2
Note: Variables measured using a 4-item scale: 1 fully disagree—2 rather disagree—3 rather agree—4 fully agree. See Appendix B, question
16 for details.
Compared to the results of the European Social Survey on attitudes towards climate
change [42] in 2016–2017 respondents are somewhat less sure that climate changes
(91.3% compared to 95.4%; and agree less that humans are responsible for this change
(88.5% compared to 94.8%). The latter difference in particular may result from differences in
the statements that should be evaluated. While the European Social Survey asks if “climate
change [is] at least partially caused by humans”, this weakening is not present in the statement
in this survey. It is even more difficult to compare the statement that “climate change impacts
will be bad” (77.4% agree) with “climate change is a serious problem” (90.1% at least agree).
Note that a problem might be evaluated as serious without having bad impacts.
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4.2. Empirical Analysis
4.2.1. Results of the Factor Analysis
The exploratory factor analysis using the 25 attitudinal statements introduced in
Tables 3–6 results in four factors that exhibit an eigenvalue larger than one (see Appendix A,
Table A1 for detailed results). They explain 99% of the variation in the items based on the
Kaiser Criteria [43]. The fifth factor does not provide much additional information; hence,
this factor and the following are excluded from further analyses. The overall Kaiser–Meyer–
Olkin criteria of sampling adequacy [44] is meritorious (0.8753).
Table 7 presents the rotated factor loadings larger than 0.3, and items’ uniqueness,
i.e., how much of each item’s variance is not explained by factors. Note that each item
only belongs to a single factor. Some items have a uniqueness larger than 0.6 or even 0.8
(expecting electricity shortage) indicating that these items are less well explained by the
factors. Since this study does not aim to find the best factor but a feasible predictor, these
items remain in the present analysis.
Table 7. Rotated factors.
Factor Variable Factor Loading Uniqueness
Positive Attitude
towards TOU Tariffs
Purchasing a TOU tariff is a feasible measure to save electricity 0.6024 0.5177
Increasing average electricity prices 0.4234 0.8128
TOU tariffs ensure that power outages will continue to be rare in Germany 0.4916 0.7265
TOU tariffs mitigate CO2-emissions 0.6883 0.5080
TOU tariffs decrease electricity consumption 0.7595 0.4543
My social environment would like it
if I would choose TOU tariff 0.7084 0.4404
I expect other people around me
to behave environmentally friendly 0.3234 0.5892
For me, it would be easy to limit my electricity consumption
in case I am at home when electricity prices are high 0.6392 0.5862




TOU tariffs increase monthly electricity costs 0.6685 0.4858
TOU tariffs increase electricity providers’ profits 0.6473 0.5001
TOU tariffs will lead to electricity shortages
during certain times 0.4109 0.8047
I am doing already enough to save energy;





Climate change is a serious problem 0.8472 0.2532
My personal actions influence climate change 0.6589 0.4961
People are responsible for climate change 0.7459 0.4317
There will be a solution to climate change
without limiting our lifestyle −0.5342 0.6694
Scientific predictions regarding climate change are trustworthy 0.6909 0.4829
I am sure that climate change is happening 0.8280 0.3712
Media exaggerates climate change −0.7546 0.4074
I do not want others to suffer




Switching off electrical appliances instead of using stand-by 0.6944 0.5475
Switching off lights when leaving a room 0.7149 0.4919
Buying electrical appliances with low electricity consumption 0.7498 0.4201
Replacing old light bulbs or halogen bulbs
by electricity saving alternatives 0.6543 0.5402
Note: Factor loadings are presented if they are larger 0.3. Sample Size = 990.
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The first factor named Positive Attitude towards TOU Tariffs comprises positive state-
ments on TOU tariffs. It relates to the main elements of the TPB and parts of the VBN, such
as awareness of consequences and need. Attitude in the sense of TPB includes its feasibility
as an electricity saving measure as well as its positive effects. Additionally, Positive Attitude
includes respondents’ subjective norms, their perceived behavioral control, and their sense
of ‘warm glow’. Its counterpart, Negative Attitude towards TOU Tariffs, measures respon-
dents’ expectations of negative impacts and their belief that they are already doing enough
to save energy. The factor Climate Change Awareness includes the items of the climate change
awareness scale plus altruism; hence, it captures values in the sense of the VBN. The last
factor measures respondents’ Belief in Energy Saving Measures in general.
Using all factor loadings (including those below 0.3) factors are predicted for each
respondent. Factor means are standardized to zero. Standard deviation ranges from 0.81
(Negative Attitude) to 0.90 (Positive Attitude). T-tests on differences in factor means suggest
that females exhibit a significantly more Positive Attitude (5%-level) and less Negative Attitude
towards TOU Tariffs (1%-level). Furthermore, they are more Climate Change Aware (1%-level)
and have a stronger Belief in Energy Saving Measures (1%-level). Moreover, I found regional
differences. Respondents living in northern Germany exhibit a more Positive (5%-level)
and less Negative Attitude towards TOU Tariffs (5%-level) as well as a higher Climate Change
Awareness (5%-level) compared to respondents from other parts of Germany. One possible
explanation could be that a lot of renewable energy is generated in northern Germany. Further
t-tests show that respondents with a 100% renewables tariff are more Climate Change Aware
(5%-level). Income does not play a significant role in attitude formation.
4.2.2. Results of the Regression Analysis
This aimed to analyze if behavioral attitudes, i.e., the identified factors, explain if
respondents are more willing to choose a TOU tariff than their current tariff (Table 8). Note
that factors’ coefficients relate to effects that deviate from mean attitudes.
The first model (Model 1) includes only the above factors as explanatory variables. A
more Positive than average Attitude towards TOU Tariffs has a large positive significant effect
on willingness to choose a TOU tariff and explains most of the variation; Negative Attitude
has a small negative significant effect. Climate Change Awareness and Belief in Energy Saving
Measures have no significant effect in this model. However, using principal factors in a
factor analysis allows for correlated factors. Indeed, Climate Change Awareness and Belief in
Energy Saving Measures are significantly (1%-level) correlated (Spearman’s rho = 0.4758).
Therefore, Model 2 excludes Belief in Energy Saving Measures, and Model 3 excludes Climate
Change Awareness to check if their effects overlap. In Model 2 the effect of Climate Change
Awareness is small and negative, and significant only at the 10%-level. This indicates that
respondents who are more climate change conscious are more likely to believe that energy
should be saved in general, rather than just shifting demand.
Model 4 extends Model 2 such that it includes additional covariates, which are not
correlated with any factor. Respondents who consider themselves as less willing to take
risks have a higher willingness to choose a TOU tariff. Furthermore, respondents who are
already planning to change their electricity tariff are more likely to be in favor of TOU
tariffs. The effect of age is inverted U-shaped; middle-aged respondents are more likely
to choose a TOU tariff. Furthermore, a larger household size also has a positive effect. A
possible explanation could be that daily routine of larger households is more structured
and is easier to adjust.
To evaluate the predictive power of Model 4, its results are used to predict the margins
of respondents’ willingness to choose a TOU tariff. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the
observed values against the predicted margins. Overall, Model 4 predicts the distribution
well. On the individual level the prediction corresponds to the actual willingness to choose a
TOU tariff in only 60% of cases but the deviation is greater than one category in only 3.5%
of cases.
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Table 8. Ordered Logit models to predict willingness to choose a TOU tariff.
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(0.1139) (0.1138) (0.1121) (0.1182)
Negative Attitude
towards TOU Tariffs
−0.4332 *** 0.000 −0.4412 *** 0.000 −0.4217 *** 0.000 −0.4637 *** 0.000
(0.0936) (0.0922) (0.0920) (0.0930)
Climate Change
Awareness
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Dummy = 1 if household
plans to switch tariff
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“rather disagree” −2.2219 −2.2193 −2.2205 0.0409
(0.1223) (0.1219) (0.1224) (0.5896)
“rather agree” 0.5752 0.5725 0.5752 2.9260
(0.0773) (0.0771) (0.0772) (0.5938)
“fully agree” 3.5031 3.5041 3.4975 5.9624
(0.1486) (0.1490) (0.1483) (0.6293)
Goodness
of fit
Log pseudolikelihood − 942.7650 − 943.2391 − 943.5082 − 919.4592
Pseudo-R2 0.2373 0.2369 0.2367 0.2562
Note: Sample size = 990. Stars indicating significance at 1%-level: ***; at 5%-level: **; at 10%-level: *. Robust standard errors.
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respondents’ willingness to purchase a TOU tariff. Respondents are more likely to choose 
these tariffs if they are more willing to take risk. This is in line with the results of the 
choice experiment by Schlereth et al. [12] who find that German consumers who are 
risk-averse prefer time invariant pricing. Furthermore, I observed that respondents who 
have experience with TOU or smart home tariffs are more likely to adopt TOU tariffs. 
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5. Discussion
This study investigates the influence of behavioral attitudes on consumers’ willingness
to choose TOU tariffs. An exploratory factor analysis identifies four factors that load on
those attitudes. A first factor measures respondents’ Positive Attitude towards TOU Tariffs
related to the TPB and VBN and warm glow. Its counterpart comprises respondents’
Negative Attitude towards TOU Tariffs based on their perceived negative impacts. A third
factor measures Climate Change Awareness based on a scale dealing with statements about
climate change adopted from the NEP-scale and altruism. A fourth factor covers general
Belief in Energy Saving Measures. Remarkably, women tend to have a more Positive and less
Negative Attitude towards TOU Tariffs and are more Climate Change Aware. The same holds
for respondents living in Northern Germany who are more experienced with renewable
energy facilities.
An ensuing ordered logit estimation using these factors to explain stated willingness to
choose TOU tariffs identifies three significant factors: Positive and Negative Attitude towards
TOU Tariffs as well as Climate Change Awareness. While a more Positive and less Negative
Attitude towards TOU Tariffs unsurprisingly increases the probability that respondents
choose a TOU tariff, a higher Climate Change Awareness slightly decreases that probability.
For the latter, one possible explanation could be that more climate-conscious respondents
prefer a general reduction in energy consumption rather than just a shift in demand. This
issue has also been reported by focus groups discussing cost-reflective electricity tariffs
in Australia [15]. Furthermore, Hall et al. [15] found that women are less in favor of
TOU tariffs, which may be due to women being more climate change aware. However,
the effect of Climate Change Awareness is small and only significant at the 10%-level. In
addition, I find that women have a more Positive and less Negative Attitude towards TOU
Tariffs. This indicates that these differences in attitudes could explain lower WTA values of
women for TOU tariffs as estimated in choice experiments by, for example, Buryk et al. [14].
Nonetheless, it appears that the gender effect is more indirectly driven by differences in
attitudes.
Adding additional covariates to the model results in further insights of drivers for
respondents’ willingness to purchase a TOU tariff. Respondents are more likely to choose
these tariffs if they are more willing to take risk. This is in line with the results of the
choice experiment by Schlereth et al. [12] who find that German consumers who are risk-
averse prefer time invariant pricing. Furthermore, I observed that respondents who have
experience with TOU or smart home tariffs are more likely to adopt TOU tariffs. Also,
respondents who plan to change their tariff are more likely to be in favor of TOU tariffs.
Not surprisingly, middle-aged respondents are more in favor of TOU tariffs, while older
and younger ones are more critical. This finding is similar to Yang et al. [10] where elderly
Chinese people were less likely to state they are willing to choose a TOU tariff. However,
they assumed a linear relationship of age instead of a U-shaped one. It is noteworthy that
larger households favor TOU tariffs. This finding already surprised Nicolson et al. [13]
since they expected that households with children would exhibit a lower willingness to
switch to a TOU tariff. However, I think that larger households might be better organized
than smaller ones, making it easier for them to adjust. For example, large households can
shift their laundry from one day to the next, while single households have less laundry
overall, so their ability to shift laundry is lower.
Preferences for TOU tariffs might additionally differ by total electricity consumption,
housing characteristics or the life-cycle of a household. Although electricity consumption
was queried (Appendix B, question 8), a majority of the values did not pass a plausibility
test. Therefore, it was not possible to take this variable into account. Housing characteristics
were only included to a small extend in the questionnaire, i.e., if a household has electric
heating, and if their house has a solar panel/photovoltaic (Appendix B, questions 4 to 6).
These variables were insignificant, thus, excluded from further analysis. One reason might
be that households with electric heating are more likely to already have a smart home or
TOU tariff (31% instead of 14%). The life-cycle of a household has been approximated by
Energies 2021, 14, 5406 13 of 20
respondents’ employment status (Appendix B, question 26). However, this variable has not
been proven as feasible in this analysis. This might due to the fact that respondents were
already queried to state their perceived possibility to adapt their electricity consumption
(Appendix B, question 19). Thus, this life-cycle effect has already been captured by this
statement that is captured in the factor Positive Attitude towards TOU tariffs.
It is interesting to note that income is an insignificant factor. Electricity is a basic
need and consumption is rather independent of income. Since quality does not differ
significantly, it is primarily prices per kWh and, as this study suggests, intrinsic motivation,
that drive consumer decisions. Decision makers who want to promote TOU tariffs could
benefit from these findings by highlighting positive impacts of TOU tariffs and addressing
preconceptions about TOU tariffs and their benefits to utility companies. Buryk et al. [14]
showed that information about system and environmental benefits of TOU tariffs reduce
compensation required for acceptance of TOU tariffs. However, decision makers should be
aware that this moral suasion does not necessarily lead to significant habit formation. In a
field experiment, Ito et al. [45] demonstrated that financial incentives are more persistent.
They observed that consumers who were nudged by moral suasion to shift their electricity
demand to off-peak hours showed less persistent behavior change than consumers who
were nudged by financial incentives.
6. Conclusions
This study shows that TPB and VBN explain a significant share of preference het-
erogeneity for TOU tariffs. While attitudes towards these tariffs (respectively awareness
of consequences, need, and responsibility) and warm glow clearly influence preferences;
climate change awareness including altruism have no distinct effect. Even though these
attitudes might vary over time (e.g., recent flood events in Germany might increase climate
change awareness) and countries, I expect their influence to remain persistent in size. Fur-
thermore, the results of the factor analysis should not change when respondents’ attitudes
change, because the individual factors are determined based on the correlations between
the statements. However, this survey has to be repeated for Germany, and similar analysis
has to be undertaken for other countries in order to test this hypothesis.
Excluding some of these attitudes or a measure for risk behavior of respondents
would probably lead to systematic biases in future analyses. For example, this study shows
that gender effects, which are inconclusive over studies, might result from differences in
attitudes. This might due to the fact that women have a more Positive and less Negative
Attitude towards TOU Tariffs, that increases willingness to choose a TOU tariff, while they
exhibit a higher Climate Change Awareness that rather decreases this willingness. Since these
results are limited to TOU tariffs, future research should test if the identified factors, and
therefore attitudes, influence preferences for dynamic electricity tariffs on a similar level.
An important limitation constitutes that this study has not tested to what extend
financial incentives influence consumers’ willingness to choose a TOU tariff. Respondents
where only informed that, if they adapt their electricity consumption to a TOU tariff
properly (see Appendix B, question 11), they would be able to decrease their electricity bill.
Further research should, therefore, take the attitudinal statements presented in this survey
into account when estimating willingness to accept TOU tariffs.
Since attitudes significantly influence preferences for TOU tariffs, policy makers
should clearly communicate environmental and potential financial benefits to consumers,
and at the same time eliminate prejudges. Nevertheless, in the case of Germany, unavail-
ability of TOU and dynamic tariffs remains the core issue. The latest amendment of the
Energiewirtschaftsgetz [5] that forces utility companies to offer at least one TOU tariff
or even dynamic tariff to end consumers will not necessarily increase supply to private
households. A major obstacle is that smart meter roll-out in Germany (i.e., installation of a
digital meter plus a communication device, which is necessary to enable dynamic tariffs)
is only mandatory for end consumers exceeding an electricity consumption of 6000 kWh
per year (e.g., households with a heat pump or an electric vehicle) or prosumers with an
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installed capacity of at least 7 kW [46]. All other households will only receive digital meters.
German policy makers should, therefore, think over their strategy of smart-meter roll-out
if they want to increase adoption of modern TOU tariffs or dynamic tariffs since, even
though, policy makers would succeed in increasing positive attitudes towards TOU tariffs,
households would need to actively demand these additional communication devices. This
issue further hinders households from choosing a TOU tariff.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Results unrotated factor analysis.
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1:
Climate Change Awareness 6.3799 3.4904 0.5317 0.5317
Factor 2:
Positive Attitude towards TOU Tariffs 2.8895 1.4132 0.2408 0.7726
Factor 3:
Belief in Energy Saving Measures 1.4763 0.3434 0.1230 0.8956
Factor 4:
Negative Attitude towards TOU Tariffs 1.1329 0.5870 0.0944 0.9900
Factor 5 2.92 (0.72)
Note: Sample size = 990; Method: principle factors on items’ polychoric correlation matrix.
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Appendix B
Translated Questionnaire (Original in German)
1. Please indicate your gender:
• Female
• Male
2. How old are you?
















• I do not live in Germany
4. Do you use one or several of following electricity using appliances to heat water?
(Multiple answers allowed)
• Boiler
• Instantaneous water heater
• Electricity is not used to heat water
5. Do you heat with electricity?
• Exclusively/Mostly
• Sometimes (e.g., heating fan during winter)
• Never
• Don’t know




7. How do you estimate the electricity consumption of your household compared to






8. Please, estimate how much electricity your household consumed during last year?
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9. Electricity tariffs may have different characteristics. Which of the following char-
acteristics does your current electricity tariff have? (Multiple answers allowed;
Options: yes, no, don’t know)
• 100% electricity from renewable energies
• Electricity price dependent of time of day and day of the week
• Special tariff for heat pump or night storage heating
• Regional origin of electricity from renewable energy is known
• Smart home tariff
10. Which of the following reasons influences your decision for your electricity tariff?
(Multiple answers allowed; Options: yes, no, don’t know)
• Comprehensibility of tariff description
• Share of renewable energy
• Origin of electricity (e.g., regional)
• Electricity price per kilowatt-hour
• Other reasons, namely:
11. Information on TOU tariffs
• Treatment 1:
Please read the following text carefully:
There is currently a lot of discussion in Germany about the future of electricity
supply. Among other things, electricity consumption is to be reduced at times
of day when it is particularly high; for example, in the morning after many
people have got up. The high electricity consumption at these times must be
compensated by electricity from additional gas and coal-fired power plants.
These power plants are otherwise not needed, causing correspondingly high
costs and CO2-emissions.
For this reason, consideration is being given to adjusting the electricity price
during periods of high electricity consumption (i.e., 6 to 10 am and 4 to 8 pm). In
these times, the price of electricity would be higher than it is today, otherwise
lower. If you were to adjust your electricity consumption accordingly, you could
actually pay less overall than you do now.
• Treatment 2:
Please read the following text carefully:
There is currently a lot of discussion in Germany about the future of electricity
supply. Among other things, electricity consumption is to be reduced during
times when little electricity is available from renewable sources; for example,
when wind conditions are poor. If electricity consumption is not reduced during
these times, it must be offset by electricity from additional gas and coal-fired
power plants. These power plants are otherwise not needed, causing correspond-
ingly high costs and CO2 emissions.
For this reason, consideration is being given to adjusting the price of electricity
to the availability of electricity from renewable sources. If the availability is low
(you will be informed in time by your electricity provider), the electricity price
will be higher than at present, and if the availability is high, it will be lower. If
you were to adjust your electricity consumption accordingly, you could pay less
overall than you do now.




13. Does your household plan to change its electricity tariff during the next 6 months?
• Yes
• Maybe
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• No
• Don’t know
14. Who in your household is in charge for decisions in electricity supply (e.g., provider,
tariff etc.)?
• Just me
• Me together with others
• Others but me
• Don’t know






16. To what extend do you agree with the following statements? (Options: I fully agree;
I rather agree; I rather disagree; I fully disagree)
• Climate change is a serious problem
• My personal actions influence climate change
• Humans are responsible for climate change
• There will be a solution to climate change without limiting our lifestyle
• Scientific predictions regarding climate change are trustworthy
• I am sure that climate change is happening
• Media exaggerates climate change
17. Private households face different options to save electricity. To what extend do you
think following options are feasible to decrease electricity consumption? (Options:
unfeasible; rather unfeasible; rather feasible; feasible)
• Purchasing an electricity tariff, which electricity price is very high while electric-
ity consumption is high / energy supply from renewables is low and very low
otherwise
• Switching off electrical appliances instead of using stand-by
• Increasing average electricity prices
• Switching off lights when leaving a room
• Buying electrical appliances with low electricity consumption
• Replacing old light bulbs or halogen bulbs by electricity saving alternatives
• Other, namely:
18. To what extend do you agree with following statements about an electricity tariff with
higher electricity prices while electricity consumption is high/energy supply from
renewables is low and very low otherwise? (Options: I fully agree; I rather agree; I
rather disagree; I disagree) Such an electricity tariff . . .
• . . . ensures that power outages will continue to be rare in Germany
• . . . mitigates CO2-emissions
• . . . increases monthly electricity costs
• . . . increases electricity providers’ profits
• . . . will lead to electricity shortages during certain times
• . . . decreases electricity consumption
19. To what extend do you agree with following statements about an electricity tariff with
higher electricity prices while electricity consumption is high/energy supply from
renewables is low and very low otherwise? (Options: I fully agree; I rather agree; I
rather disagree; I disagree)
• I would like to choose such an electricity tariff rather than my current electricity
tariff.
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• I am doing enough already to save energy; thus, I do not additionally need to
choose such an electricity tariff
• My social environment would like it if I would choose such an electricity tariff
• I expect other people around me to behave in an environmentally friendly way
• For me, it would be easy to limit my electricity consumption in case I am at
home during 6 to 10am and 4 to 8pm/if there little electricity from renewables is
available.
• Purchasing such an electricity tariff gives me a warm glow to contribute to
climate protection
• I do not want others to suffer from the impacts of climate change
20. How willing are you to take risks? (10 Options from 1 “absolutely not willing to take
risks” to 10 “absolutely willing to take risks”)
21. How many people belong to your household (including yourself)?
22. How much is your personal monthly net income, today?Please name your monthly
net income, i.e., excluding taxes and social insurance. Please, add regular payments
such as pensions, housing allowances, child benefits, BAföG (student benefit), alimony
etc.
• Below 1000 €
• 1000 € to under 2000 €
• 2000 € to under 2500 €
• 3000 € to under 3500 €
• 3500 € to under 4000 €
• 4000 € to under 5000 €
• 5000 € to under 7500 €
• 7500 € to under 10,000 €
• 10,000 € or more
• Prefer not to answer
23. How much is your household’s monthly net income, today?
24. Please name your household’s monthly net income, i.e., excluding taxes and social
insurance. Please, add regular payments such as pensions, housing allowances, child
benefits, BAföG (student benefit), alimony etc.
• Below 1000 €
• 1000 € to under 2000 €
• 2000 € to under 2500 €
• 3000 € to under 3500 €
• 3500 € to under 4000 €
• 4000 € to under 5000 €
• 5000 € to under 7500 €
• 7500 € to under 10,000 €
• 10,000 € or more
• Prefer not to answer
25. What is your highest school degree?
• Still in school
• Volks-/Hauptschulabschluss or comparable degree after eight/ninth grade
• Realschulabschluss/Qualified Hauptschulabschluss or comparable degree after
tenth grade
• Fachhochschulreife/fachgebundene Hochschulreife/Fachabitur (i.e., graduation
after 12th grade allowing access to Fachhochschulen (Universities of applied
science))
• General Hochschulreife/Abitur or comparable degree that allows unlimited
access to universities
• No degree
• Prefer not to answer
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26. What is your current occupation?
• Full-time job (min. 35 h/week)






• Prefer not to answer
27. Do you think that individual people may influence future decisions on electricity
supply by participating in scientific studies?
• Not at all
• Rather not
• Rather yes
• In any case
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